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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Public Private partnerships 
 
Public private partnerships (PPP) have become a popular policy instrument in many Western 
European countries. Governments assume that the involvement of private actors in the provision 
of services, or in the realization of policy goals will increase quality and provide better value for 
money. It is believed that more intense co-production between public and private actors will 
generate better results. In the literature on PPPs, these benefits are typically referred to as ‘added 
value’ (Osborne 2000; Ghobadian et al. 2004). According to the literature in this area, the main 
characteristics of PPP are: 
1. Mutual coordination of activities and daily routines: co-ordination is essential for any 
partnership, including public-private ones. The activities of the public and private 
organizations have to be well coordinated (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Hodge and Greve, 
2005) or the desired exchange of information cannot be realized (Savas 2000). 
2. A level of shared risk and profit sharing is needed: the co-operation between public and 
private actors has to result in at least some risk sharing, and if possible, in some level of 
profit sharing (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Authors point out that profit sharing does not 
always have to take the form of financial profits. It may be that the private actors have 
financial profits and the public actors get recognizable societal benefits from the co-
operation, for instance a higher quality of service (Audit Commission 2003; Hodge and 
Greve 2005). 
3. A form of organizational arrangement between the partners to enhance the co-operation 
process (see, for example, Savas 2000; Hodge et al, 2010). Most partnerships are 
structured around organizational arrangements that are meant to simplify co-ordination 
and secure the shared risk and profits. These arrangements can take the form of an 
informal project group, newly established consortiums or other hybrid organizational 
forms (Waddock 1991; Savas, 2000).  
We can thus roughly define Public private partnership (PPP) as a “more or less sustainable 
cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or services are 
developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared” (Klijn and Teisman, 2003). 
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1.2. Why would PPP generate better outcomes 
However whatever form of PPP we are talking about, the assumption that a PPP leads to better 
value for money and thus better outcomes can both be found in all the government documents 
(Kenniscentrum 2002; NAO 2002, ODPM 2002, 2004; Rekenkamer, 2013) as well as in the 
academic literature (Osborne 2000; Savas 2000; Klijn and Teisman 2003; Hodge and Greve 
2005). In their evaluation of a PFI (a form of PPP see later text), established in relation to British 
schools, The British Audit Commission (2003) states that it provides: (1) better value for money; 
(2) buys services and not things; (3) provides better risk management; and (4) leaves a long-term 
legacy. We find the same kind of arguments in other countries, like The Netherlands (for details, 
see Kenniscentrum 2002; Rekenkamer, 2013).  
In general, these outcomes related improvements can take several forms. The literature speaks 
mostly in terms of securing the same outcomes for lower costs (efficiency), or greater outcomes 
for the same cost (added value) (Kenniscentrum 2002). One could however add a third category 
of innovative solutions, or solutions that have not been achieved before (Borys and Jemison 
1989; Hodge and Greve 2005): 
• More efficiency: partnerships and the co-operation they engender result in lower costs and 
greater efficiency (Osborne, 2000; Savas 2000). One example of this is in the area of building 
projects where decisions might be made faster. Of course, more intense co-operation implies 
greater transaction costs, which should not exceed the possible revenues (Williamson 1996).  
• Added value: public and private actors can add value to each other’s performance because 
their efforts enhance the value of the product or service that is being delivered. The classic 
example is that of a co-operative effort of drafting a master plan for a newly built 
neighborhood that gives coherence to the total project, and thus raises the value of the 
individual dwellings. 
• More innovative results: another often heard advantage of partnerships is that actors are able 
to realize better, more innovative solutions by harnessing each other's knowledge and 
expertise (Parker and Vaidia 2001; Huxham and Vangen 2005). 
 
1.3. Organizational forms of PPP’s 
A wide variety of forms in which the PPP co-operation is used can be encountered. The forms 
range from strongly contractual forms, like the PFI contracts in the UK to more informal 
forms, like project groups without any formal judicial status and to tightly organized 
consortiums. The discussion on the choice of organizational form is fairly prominent in the 
partnership literature and even more prominent in the government texts about PPP (Nao, 
2002; Kenniscentrum, 2002; 2004; Klijn 2009; Rekenkamer, 2013). And this is for instance 
also true for the discussion about Urban Regeneration Partnerships (Urban Task Force Report 
1999, Kort and Klijn, 2011). However one cannot find definitive statements about which 
organizational form is the best for partnerships. The literature on PFI suggests that good and 
tight contracts seem to be the best. Of course the implicit assumption is that public actors 
have a clear idea about what it is they want to achieve and to thus to contract out. The 
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literature on URC’s suggests tight partnership forms at arm’s length from the government to 
be the best (Urban Task Force, 1999, 2005; VROM 2002).  
 
A typology of public private partnerships 
If we look at the wide variety of literature we see that the discussion focuses on the form of 
organization on the one hand (is the partnership organized in a strongly formalized form like a 
contract or a newly set up organization or not) and whether the relation between the public and 
private actors is more an equal (principle to principle) relation or more like a principle agent 
relations (see Osborne, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Weihe, 2008). If we combine these two 
dimensions we get the table as presented in table 1. In each cell an example has been presented of 
the type of partnership that evolves out of the dichotomy. 
Table 1: A typology of forms of PPP 
Type of relation A principle agent relation Partnership relation (equal principle-
principle relations) 
Organizational form 
Tight organizational form 1. 
Design Finance Built Operate 
contracts (PFI like partnerships) 
2. 
Consortium (like Urban Regeneration 
Companies) 
Loosely coupled 3. 
Intensive general cooperation 
between public private actors (in 
policy programs for instance) 
4. 
Network like partnership (intensive 
long time but organizational lose 
relationship) 
Adapted from Klijn, 2010 
When the form is tight and the relation has a strong principle agent relation we find ourselves in 
the DFBO contracts of the Private Finance Initiative in the UK. (cell 1). If we have a more 
principle-principle relation public and private actors jointly create and fund a separate 
organizational form like in the situation of the Urban Regeneration Companies we discussed 
earlier (cell 2). When the form is loosely coupled and the relation is a principle agent one we are 
talking about more general relations where public actors involve private actors to provide 
services or policy outcomes that match goals and aims of the public actors (Cell 3). Examples 
that have been mentioned here are for instance the relation between private schools and public 
actors, where public actors support private schools and private schools provide services that fit 
public goals (see for instance Weihe, 2008). This could be loosely contracts or implementation 
actions of private actors that fit in policy programs. One could question whether this really still 
belongs to the PPP category, because it is hardly a concrete partnership, but there are authors that 
do so (see the policy approach as discussed by Weihe, 2008). If we see a principle-principle 
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relation with a loosely coupled organization form we see PPP that have a network like character 
where there is mostly fairly intense interaction but only contract or organizational form when it 
comes to implementation activities (cell 4). This type of partnerships can be found in complex 
urban restructuring where public and private actors have intense interactions during a fairly long 
period of decision-making and developing and organizational form are only installed at the end.  
Design Build Finance Operating and Alliance partnerships 
The most well-known and used PPP models are the contractual or DFBO partnerships (type 1) 
and the consortium partnerships (type 2). So these partnerships will be dealt with more in depth. 
In the first form of PPP the contractual character of PPP is stressed. The design, building, 
financing and commercial operation of an infrastructure project (such as a road, or a building like 
a school) are integrated into a contract (a DFBO contract). The added value lies in the lower costs 
of coordination between the various components (often expressed as ‘efficiency’ or ‘value for 
money’ gains). Even though these efficiencies are necessary for a PPP concession, they would 
not be sufficient to attract private or public sector interest. Their interest arises from the 
opportunity to create substantive added value. For example, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
tendering system used in the UK for the road construction bundles design, build, finance, and 
operation are contracted out to private consortia for a period of 30 years. The consortium can use 
more sustainable (expensive) building materials to save on future maintenance costs. The 
payment system rewards the ‘availability’ of roads (NAO, 2002; ODPM, 2002, 2004) rather than 
second-guessing the costs of constructing them. The opportunity for a long-term involvement in a 
project provides both the potential for devising new solutions to problems and protects a risk 
aversion to untested. Of course the essence of such a model is that the public actor can specify the 
goals at the beginning clear enough. 
In the second form, separate activities are integrated to create added value. In this case, PPP is a 
consortium. This type of cooperation, usually involves the creation of a joint organization that 
coordinates the partnerships activities and  is usually found in urban reconstruction and 
regeneration projects where measures to strengthen transport are combined with measures aimed 
at improving the living environment and/or housing and measures aimed at strengthening the 
economy. In this method of cooperation, added value is generated by combining substantive 
activities and projects which then reinforce each other. This also makes it possible to achieve a 
financial trade-off between profitable and less profitable but socially interesting components. 
In these two forms of PPP, the method of co-production is regulated in different ways. In the 
contract form there is limited co-production between public and private actors. This primarily 
consists of interaction at the start of a PPP project regarding the basic principles of the project to 
be contracted out. This mode of co-operation is a variation on the classic method of contract 
allocation. Here, though, attempts are made to increase added value for both public and private 
parties through ‘new forms’ of contract relationship. The precondition for success for this type of 
approach to co-production is that the public party should be able to specify the problem (though 
not the solution, which would be the case in a ‘traditional’ contracting arrangement) and that 
clear rules for the tendering process exist (Klijn, 2002). The organizational cooperation 
constructions, or partnerships, model of PPP involves a far more intensive interaction because the 
various project components which are often the domain of diverse private and public actors have 
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to be coordinated. Moreover, it is more difficult to clearly delineate in advance the content and 
ambitions of the cooperation.  
The difference in responsibility and risk division between the two forms is crucial. In a contract 
relationship there is a clear delineation of responsibility and risk and both ex-ante and ex-post 
negotiations will test that delineation. The commissioning party (the public party) is responsible 
for the problem/project specifications. After some co-production in the early phase (pre-contract 
negotiations), responsibilities are very strictly divided between public and private parties. Once 
the tendering process has been concluded the relationship is one of regulation. The principal (the 
public actor) monitors the behavior and actions of the agent (the private actors). 
In a partnership the co-production is longer-term and more intensive since parties are also jointly 
responsible for the implementation. At the least, coordination is necessary because the parties’ 
contributions have to be tailored to one another, and more joint product or policy development 
takes place. A comparison between contract partnership - in whatever form – and consortium 
partnership is illustrated in Table 1 
Table 1 Co-production in PPP through contracts and consortium partnership.  
Characteristics Contract partnership Consortium partnership 
Type of relationship Client (public party) and contractor 
(private party) 
Joint decision making (searching for 
linkages) 
Division of responsibility Clear division (both in developing 
and in implementing projects) 
Shared responsibility (in R&D 
activities but often during realization) 
Specification of problem and solution Public party specifies problem and 
solution/product 
Public and private party involved in 
joint process of problem and solution 
specification 
Scope of project Tendency to search for clear 
divisions; any scope expansion must 
fall within the delineated 
responsibilities 
Tendency to search for scope 
expansion and linking of elements  
Preconditions for success  Clear contract and tendering rules 
and clearly formulated 
problems/project requirements 
Linking ambitions and goals, 
effective rules for interaction to 
create commitment and profitable 
cooperation 
Organizing principles Separation of principal and agent, 
strict rules for tendering, competition 
during tendering, rules for judging 
outputs 
Most important rules: joint rules for 
decision making, exit, conflict 
regulation, joint production and 
division of benefits 
Management principles Strongly based on principles of 
project management (specifying 
goals, organizing time planning, 
organizing manpower) 
Based on principles of process 
management (searching for goals, 
linking and connecting actors’ 
activities, and linking of decisions) 
Information exchange Strictly separated and used as 
strategic resource 
Indispensable resource that needs to 
be shared 
Pay off rules Actors maximize their own profit 
(pay off rules separate profits of 
actors). Transaction costs are mainly  
made in monitoring agent and 
tendering procedure 
Actors maximize joint benefit (pay 
off rules tie actors to each other). 
Transaction costs are mainly  made in 
organizing process and exchange of 
information 
Type of co-production Limited and occurring primarily prior 
to the tendering process; after that 
only monitoring; no co-production 
Extensive during the whole process; 
at first primarily regarding nature of 
ambitions and searching for linkages, 
later on more co-production in jointly 
realizing ambitions 
Source: Klijn et al, 2007 
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1.4.Core ideas of PPP: what enhances partnership performance 
But we not only see various forms of but we also see many different reasons why PPP’s would be 
useful. In general policy makers and researchers assume that a more intensive cooperation 
between public and private parties will produce better and more efficient policy outcomes (the so 
called added value) and policy products (Savas, 2000; Ghobadian et all (2004); Hodge and 
Greve, 2005). The key ‘partnership’ mechanism is that private parties are involved earlier and 
more intensively in the decision making process, than is the case with more traditional client-
supplier or principal-agent relationships. But the way this should be done and the assumption 
how this improves interactions and outputs are quite different in the available literature. This is 
due to the fact that the idea of public private partnerships is as we have argued earlier a hybrid 
idea (Kort and Klijn, 2011). One can find assumptions from two major theoretical perspectives in 
Public Administration: New Public Management and governance.  
PPP as new public management arrangement: the characteristics of the contract 
On the one hand one can recognize ideas from New Public Management that have become 
dominant in Public Administration since the eighties. In these ideas governments should focus on 
the formulation of public policy and leave the implementation to other bodies (private 
organizations or nonprofit organizations) (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). For that a separation of 
policy implementation and policy formation should be encouraged by privatization, outsourcing, 
agentification and a stronger emphasis on market mechanism and involvement of private actors 
(Hood, 1991). Public actors should control the implementation by performance indicators or 
market mechanisms.  
One can clearly trace a number of these ideas in the public private partnerships debate where it 
stresses efficiency and tendering and outsourcing as possible forms of organizing PPP’s (Nao, 
2002; Hodge and Greve, 2005). This is especially strong in the literature on Private Finance 
Initiative in the UK which has so dominated the discussion on PPP the last 10-15 years. These 
ideas about efficiency, risk allocation etc. are clearly inspired by the ideas of the new Public 
management. But this can also be said abound the suggestions that PPP should be given clear 
performance indicators and about the idea that we should organize PPP’s in separate body’s one 
could say at arms’ length (Pollitt et. all, 2004). The idea of arm’s length means that separate 
bodies are created at some distance of political institutions. Mostly distinction are being made 
between disaggregation (the degree of which a body is separated from political and governmental 
institutions) and autonomization (the degree to which these bodies have discretionary power to 
make independent decision) (see Pollitt et all, 2004). Arm’s length enables managerial principles 
to be become more dominant in these bodies which will enhance efficiency and effectiveness 
(Pollitt et all, 2004). These arm’s length bodies should be guided by performance criteria set 
before by political bodies. These ideas of separate arm’s length bodies and performance 
indicators can both be found in the contractual PFI form but also in the idea of Urban 
regeneration Partnerships which have been mentioned in the previous section (Geddes, 2008). 
These Urban regeneration Companies are jointly initiatives of public and private actors and are 
used to develop but above all implement urban policies and restructure specific areas. Or as the 
Urban Task Force in the UK led by Lord Rogers state: “The pace of regeneration could be 
increased if responsibilities for delivering area programs was placed in the hands of ‘arm’s 
length’ organizations, owned by local partnerships. Urban Regeneration Companies could not 
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only oversee work to completion, but also raise private finance and undertake direct development 
where necessary”(Urban Task Force, 1999). 
PPP as governance arrangement: managerial effort crucial 
However one can also recognize ideas in the PPP literature that resemble more the arguments that 
are present in the vast literature on governance. That literature on governance stresses the 
importance of horizontal coordination between public actors and other actors and the fact that it is 
difficult or impossible to revert to top down steering in a network society in which independence 
has increased because of specialization and knowledge spread and in which citizens emphasize 
voice rather than loyalty (see Sorensen and Torfing 2007; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
Governance literature emphasizes the complex nature of decision-making and service delivery, 
the dependence of other actors and the need for horizontal coordination and active forms of 
network management that promote cooperation between public and private actors, the generation 
of new innovative solutions and the use of knowledge among the actors and reduce veto powers 
and obstruction (see Agranoff and Mcguire 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Sorenson and 
Torfing, 2007). 
One can clearly also find some core element of the discussion on governance in the ideas on PPP. 
One can think of the assumption that co-production between public and private actors results in 
exchanging more information and the usage of each other’s knowledge and so generate more 
innovative and better products and policy outputs for complex societal problems. Although the 
governance literature does mention organizational structure and form (Mandell, 2001) it tend to 
stress institutional and even more so managerial characteristics that are decisive for achieving 
good outcomes. Mostly these managerial efforts are labelled network management (Gage and 
Mandell, 1990; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Meir and O’ Toole, 2007; Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004). Without these managerial strategies reaching desirable outcomes is assumed to be very 
hard. 
The governance literature would also emphasize that PPP projects are not developed and 
implemented in isolation between a public and a private partner but are affected intensively by 
the network of stakeholders that forms itself around a project. Thus managing that environment 
along with managing the project is crucial.  
These managerial efforts are dubbed ‘network management’ (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 
Mandell 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Meier and O’ Toole 2007). The literature on 
governance suggests that without these managerial strategies, it is difficult, indeed almost 
impossible to achieve desirable outcomes (for an overview, see O Toole 1988; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Klijn et al. 2010a).  
 
The number of network management strategies that have been dealt with in the literature is 
impressive (see, for instance, O’Toole 1988; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001). It is 
clear, however, that if the network manager is to achieve significant outcomes, he has to 
implement a range of different strategies (see, for example, Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001). In general, one can make out four different categories of network 
management strategies: connecting actors, exploring content (creating more variety, organizing 
research, exploring the perceptions of different actors, and so on), arranging the structure of the 
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interaction (securing a temporary organizational arrangement for interactions) and establishing 
process rules (designing temporary agreements and rules to govern interactions) (for details, see 
Klijn et al. 2010a). The literature appears to stress the importance of these strategies, leading one 
to draw the conclusion that in general, networks and projects that employ a number of different 
strategies will achieve better results. 
Some scholars approach network managers as individuals who have the explicit role or function 
to manage the network (see Meier and O'Toole 2007). However, management is not the act of 
one individual exclusively. Many individuals in the network may be performing management 
activities and different people may have impact on the interrelations between actors and the 
development of collaborations (Kickert et al. 1997). In other words, management is an activity 
that can be conducted by one or more actor working simultaneously. In the survey various items 
have been included to measure especially two types of network management strategies: exploring 
and connecting as these proved to be the most important in earlier research (see Klijn et al, 2010) 
 
1.5. The survey: what is being researched 
In the survey we explored several of the theoretical issues raised above. We looked at 
1. The performance and innovative character of outcomes of PPP’s as we would like to link 
these to several characteristics of partnerships 
2. The contractual characteristics of the PPP projects; as we would like to analyses the 
relation of contractual characteristics with performance 
3. Some characteristics of the projects that are said to influence the performance (the nature 
of competition with tendering, the technical complexity of the project etc.) 
4. The managerial efforts that are put in the partnership project 
5. Relational characteristics of the public and private partner (level of trust, the durability of 
the relation etc.) 
6. The characteristic of the wider network around the PPP project 
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2. The survey: design and respondents 
For the survey respondents were collected that are involved in known PPP projects in The Netherlands. 
For that we first looked at the projects that were mentioned in official government documents of the 
various ministries. We also received addresses from a few PPP advisory organizations like PPS support (a 
governmental organization that supports mainly local organized PPP projects). All in all we identified 
most of the known PPP projects and selected respondents from each organization involved by looking at 
websites and other information sources of the projects. The selected potential respondents were 
predominantly public and private respondents like respondents from private consortia that were selected, 
public officials involved in the projects etc.. In principle this survey thus is not a sample but represents 
almost the whole population (=people involved in official known PPP projects in The Netherlands). 
Response of the survey 
In total 343 respondents were selected and received a request to fill in the survey. We included as many 
respondents as possible since the average response for most surveys nowadays is about 30%.  In principle 
more than one person was selected for each project (and a maximum of 3 respondents from each 
organization involved in a specific project). This was done to increase the possibility that a project was 
included in the response. This of course resulted that in some cases we have more than one respondent for 
a project. 
Of the 343 respondents that were approached 10 respondents were not reached (mail undeliverable) and 
24 respondents indicated that they would not like to fill in the survey or were not involved in the project. 
That leaves a total number of 309 respondents that were actually approached. 
In total we received 157 people who responded to the survey. 13 people sent back the survey but did not 
respond to any of the questions. We deleted these from the number of respondents. This leaves 144 people 
who actually have filled in (parts of) the survey. This is a response percentage of 46,6% which is actually 
quite high. We think this percentage profits from: 
1.  the fact that we carefully selected people who are actually involved in PPP projects and thus also 
are interested in the possible results of the survey (we offered the possibility to send a report 
afterwards) 
2. We sent three reminders 
3. We actively answered people who asked questions and encouraged them to fill in the survey. 
Most of the time people after an e-mail exchange indicated that they would fill in the survey 
 
Characteristics of the respondents 
If we look at the characteristics of the respondents we can see below that the vast majority is male, 
relatively old (average 48 years) and experienced (average years of experience with complex projects 14 
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years).  
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In terms of the organization respondents work for we see three main categories: Public Organizations 
(respondents working at municipalities, central department, provinces or water boards), private 
organizations (construction companies, developers, banks etc.) and consultants.  The first group is the 
largest as can be seen in the graphs below. 
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3. Performance and innovativeness of 
outcomes 
We measured the performance of the PPP projects by several items (measured by a scale from 1-5): 
- The content results in this project receive adequate support from involved organizations 
- The various spatial functions in this project are sufficient connected to each other 
- The solutions that have been developed tackle the problems at hand 
- The content of the proposals are durable solutions 
- The costs of the project stay within the limits that have been set  
- The benefits of the projects- in general- exceeds the costs 
The table below shows the scores for each of the items for the total respondents. 
 
 
The items were related and factor analysis showed one emerging factor. Therefore we also 
created one overall scale for performance using the 6 items mentioned above. The scale had high 
reliability (Cronbach: 0.777). The scores of the overall performance indicator are shown below. 
In general the scores were rather high (close to 4 on a five point scale) indicating respondents 
were satisfied with the outcomes. 
We also looked at the differences in performance judgments between the three groups of 
respondents but the differences was not significant, meaning that the three groups had on average 
the same opinion about the performance of the PPP projects. 
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We also had several items on the innovativeness of outcomes. One of the core items in the PPP literature 
is that PPP can lead to innovative products because private consortia are related in an earlier moment to 
the project. We measured project innovativeness by 5 items that were measured on a 1-10 scale: 
- 1. In this project, compared to similar projects, no new innovative solutions were created (In this 
project, compared to similar projects, a lot of new innovative solutions were created) 
- 2. In this project no new technology has been developed or is used in the realization (In this 
project much new technology has been developed or is used in the realization) 
- 3. In this project various societal functions are hardly connected to each other (In this project 
various societal functions are strongly connected to each other ) 
- 4. The innovative character of the project is far below the expectations I had before (The 
innovative character of the project is far above the expectations I had before) 
- 5. In this project we have developed no innovative ways of financing (In this project we have 
developed innovative ways of financing) 
  
3.88
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3.94
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4
4.02
4.04
Public Private Consultant Total
Performance 
Mean
16 
 
The average scores of the items are visualized below. 
 
Item 3 and 5 were indications of the content of the project but not so much of the innovative character of 
the project. We expected the other three items to be related which turned out to be true. We used the three 
items as an overall indicator of innovativeness and the scores for the three groups of respondents on that 
overall score is presented below. As can be seen from the table there are some differences in the 
judgments of innovativeness of the project between the three groups of respondents. Respondents with a 
private background have a higher opinion of the innovative character of the projects than public actors, 
who have the lowest opinion, and consultants. An anova analysis shows that the differences are 
significant. 
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4. Trust in PPP: the crucial factor? 
One of the factors mentioned often as important in partnerships is the existence of trust between 
the partners (see Huxham and Vangen, 2005). In this survey we distinguished between two types 
of trust: the trust between the (contractual) public and private partners and the trust in the whole 
network of stakeholders (thus including the public and private partners). 
We measured the level of trust in the network by 5 items used in earlier research (see Klijn et al, 
2010). The items, all measured on a 5 point scale (totally disagree-totally agree) were: 
1. Agreement trust; the parties in this project generally live up to the agreements made with 
each other 
2. Benefit of the doubt;  the parties in this project give one another the benefit of the doubt 
3. Reliability; the parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the other parties 
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior; parties do not use the contributions of other actors for 
their own advantage 
5. Goodwill trust; parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the other parties 
are good in principle 
 
The separate scores of the items are presented below. The scores formed a very good scale 
(Cronbach 0.851), so they were computed to form one scale on trust. Those score are also 
presented below. From those scores we can see that there are some small differences in the 
overall scores on trust in the network between the three groups of respondents but these 
differences were not significant (.667) 
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We also looked at the relation between trust and performance and innovativeness. The results of the 
regression analysis below show that trust between the public and private partners has a strong positive 
influence on performance. The same can be said of trust in the total network around the project. The 
effects on project innovativeness are also strong but less strong that on performance. 
Dependent variable Predictors B 
R 
square 
Performance Trust partners .499*** .249*** 
 
Trust network .430*** .185*** 
Project Innovativeness Trust partners .336*** .113*** 
  Trust network .335*** .113*** 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05 
*p.1 
       
    
 
  
20 
 
5. Characteristics of the PPP projects 
In the survey we looked at several characteristics of the project that have been identified as 
important in the literature like the competiveness, the margin between the cost price and the 
tender price etc.. The items we had in the survey, all had to be ranked in a scale from 1-10, were: 
1. There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender process ( There was 
much competition between providers in the tender process) 
2. The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The project was 
characterized by high technological complexity) 
3. The project was characterized by a low number of external stakeholders (The project was 
characterized by a high number of external stakeholders) 
4. With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did not have 
earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we 
did have already frequent earlier contacts) 
5. According to me there is not much space between the cost price and the sum for which the 
project is contracted (According to me there is enough space between the cost price and 
the sum for which the project is contracted) 
6. The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, 
nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly affected by external conditions (for 
instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.)  
 
The results for the individual items are presented below. We can see that according to the 
respondents the projects are in general complex: they are characterized by high competiveness 
between providers, high technical complexity and many external conditions and the number of 
stakeholders is high. We will see this also when we come to the characteristics of the networks 
around the projects. In general we find lower scores for the space between the cost price and the 
sum for which the project is tendered. This score is right in the middle.
i
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If we look at the differences between the three groups of respondents only space between cost price shows 
significant differences between the three groups. 
We also looked at the influence of each of these characteristics on performance, innovativess of the 
project and trust. The results below show that the first item (competition between providers) has the 
strongest effect on performance but not innovativeness. The second characteristic technical complexity is 
the strongest related to project innovativeness which is not very surprising. In general technical 
complexity requires innovative projects. The technical complexity may even be the innovative character. 
These are also the two char4acteristics that have the most influence on the level of trust in the network. 
We also see a significant influence of another project characteristic: that is the space between the cost 
price and the sum for with the project is contracted. This has significant influence on the 
performance: more budget means better performance not surprisingly.  
Dependent 
variable Predictors B 
R 
square 
Performance 
There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender 
process (there was much competition between the providers in the 
tender process) .331*** .258*** 
 
The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The 
project was characterized by high technological complexity) .147 
 
 
The project was characterized by a low number of external 
stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of .004 
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external stakeholders) 
 
With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project 
we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party 
where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier 
contacts) - .088 
 
 
According to me there is not much space between the cost price and 
the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is 
enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project 
is contracted) .184** 
 
  
The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like 
safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly 
affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, 
nature requirements etc.)  .190*   
Project 
Innovativeness 
There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender 
process (there was much competition between the providers in the 
tender process) .082 .269*** 
 
The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The 
project was characterized by high technological complexity) .376*** 
 
 
The project was characterized by a low number of external 
stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of 
external stakeholders) - .036 
 
 
With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project 
we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party 
where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier 
contacts) .083 
 
 
According to me there is not much space between the cost price and 
the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is 
enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project 
is contracted) .000 
 
  
The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like 
safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly 
affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, 
nature requirements etc.) .201**   
Trust 
it There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender 
process (there was much competition between the providers in the 
tender process) .207** .105* 
 
The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The 
project was characterized by high technological complexity) .237** 
 
 
The project was characterized by a low number of external 
stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of 
external stakeholders) - .157 
 
 
With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project 
we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party 
where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier 
contacts) - .020 
 
 
According to me there is not much space between the cost price and 
the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is 
enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project .106 
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is contracted) 
  
The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like 
safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly 
affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, 
nature requirements etc.) - .090   
***p< .005**p < 
.05*p .1 
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6. (Hostile) media attention for the PPP 
projects 
 
Another interesting question is whether the projects receive much and positive or negative media 
attention. Part of the literature emphasizes the rather technocratic character of PPP projects (Skelcher, 
2005). For that we had 4 items in the survey one item asking the respondents whether there was much or 
little attention in the media for the project (on a scale from 1-10). The average media attention (answered 
on a question do you think this the attention of the media for this project is: very low attention –very high 
attention 10 point scale) is 6,37. So general respondents think there is quite some attention in the media 
for the project. 
The other three items were used in earlier survey to measure the nature of the media attention (negative-
positive; see Korthagen and Klijn 2014). The question asked to the respondents was: “The attention of the 
media for this project I would characterize as”: -positive-negative, accurate-full of mistakes and 
informative- sensational. Each of the items could be ranked from one extreme (1) to the other extreme 
(10) . The three items proved to form a good scale (Cronbach .718) 
There are no significant differences between the three respond groups in their judgment about how hostile 
the media are. As one can see in general most respondents do not consider the media as very hostile to the 
PPP projects they are engaged. The average score is below the score 5 (which is in the middle of the 
positive –negative score). 
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If we look at the relation of (negative or hostile) media attention with performance, 
innovativeness and trust we see that it has a negative effect on all of these variables. Thus 
negative media attention is a pretty strong predictor for lower performance, less innovativeness 
and less trust. 
 
Dependent variable Predictor B R square 
Performance Hostile media attention - .258** .067** 
Project Innovativeness Hostile media attention - .248** .062** 
Trust Hostile media attention 
- 
.377*** .142*** 
*** p < .005** p < .05* p 
< .1  
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7. Contractual characteristics of the PPP 
projects 
If it comes to the characteristics of the contract we first looked at whether there was a 
contract, the length of the contract and what was included (design, built, finance, 
maintenance and operate). As can be seen from the results below the lion share of the 
projects had a contract and the average length is about 20 years.  
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To measure the main characteristics of the contract we inserted 4 items (scored on a 1-10 scale) in the 
survey. They were: 
1. The contact has no possibilities to impose sanctions in the case the contract is not abided (the 
contract has many possibilities to impose sanctions in the case the contract is not abided) 
2. The contract is simple to understand (the contract is difficult to understand) 
3. The contract is characterized by fixed target values and norms despite circumstance (the contract 
is characterized by flexible target values and norms that can reduced or enhanced under certain 
circumstances) 
4. The contract offers very few space for negotiation (the contract offers many space for negotiation) 
The figure below presents the scores on the separate items. One can see that average scores do not differ 
much from each other 
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If we look at the contractual characteristics and their effects on performance, project innovativeness and 
trust we can see that the strongest effect for performance can be found in the room for negotiation (more 
room relates to better performance). We also see effect of the comprehensibility of the contract on trust. 
Overall however most of the contract characteristics seem to have little effect. And the overall explained 
variance (the R square) is low.  It is not at the contractual characteristics we have to look for strong 
explanations for outcomes of PPP projects despite all the theoretical attention to contracts and contract 
forms (like the emphasis on the importance of design maintenance and operating contracts). 
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Dependent 
variable Predictors B R square 
Performance 
The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-
compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement 
sanctions for non-compliance) - .175* .092** 
 
The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to 
understand) - .127 
 
 
The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances 
(The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on 
circumstances) - .045 
 
  
The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The 
contract offers a lot of room for negotiations) .209**   
Project 
Innovativeness 
The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-
compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement 
sanctions for non-compliance) - .139 .087** 
 
The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to 
understand) - .173* 
 
 
The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances 
(The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on 
circumstances) - .023 
 
  
The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The 
contract offers a lot of room for negotiations) .192**   
Trust 
The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-
compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement 
sanctions for non-compliance) - .137 .129*** 
 
The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to 
understand) - .229** 
 
 
The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances 
(The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on 
circumstances) .296*** 
 
  
The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The 
contract offers a lot of room for negotiations) - .033   
***p<.005**p<.0
5* p < .1 
   
    
     
  
30 
 
8. Relational governance 
There are various relational governance characteristics that are mentioned as important in the relation 
between the public and the private partners. In this survey we looked at some of the core characteristics. 
The figure below presents them. 
 
As we can see in general the lowest score is for the level of sharing financial risks. The highest score is 
being given by the respondents for the level of involvement of private parties and the level of alignment of 
activities. The level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction also scores high. 
If we look at the contact frequency between public and private partners in the project there is in general a 
very high frequency (at least once a week) 
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Dep. variable Predictors B 
Rsquar
e 
Performance Level of trust between public and private parties .233** .366*** 
 
Level of involvement of private parties in content 
development of the project .115 
 
 
Level of sharing of financial risks .084 
 
 
Level of alignment of activities between parties - .076 
 
 
Level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction 
between parties .095 
 
 
Level of common long-term and short-term goals between 
private and public parties .214* 
 
 
Level of people present that build and maintain sustainable 
relations with different organizations - .071 
   Rise in level of trust between public and private parties .228**   
Project 
Innovativeness 
Level of trust between public and private parties 
- .020 .298*** 
 
Level of involvement of private parties in content 
development of the project .242** 
 
 
Level of sharing of financial risks .057 
 
 
Level of alignment of activities between parties - .186* 
 
 
Level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction 
between parties - .003 
 
 
Level of common long-term and short-term goals between 
private and public parties .090 
 
 
Level of people present that build and maintain sustainable 
relations with different organizations .357*** 
   Rise in level of trust between public and private parties .107   
*** p < .005,  
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9. Characteristics of the networks around 
PPP projects 
 
PPP projects mostly take place in a complex environment where different stakeholders are trying to 
influence the project. We had several items in the survey where we wanted to get a picture of the network 
of actors around the project. We did this by asking a few questions on a 10 point scale (rankling from low 
to high). The first question we asked the respondents is how many actors were involved in the network 
around the project and after that the survey had three questions about core characteristics of the network: 
- Interactions: No interactions between involved organizations in the network-intensive 
interactions between the organizations in the network 
- Differences of opinion: No big differences in opinion between actors in the network about 
content and nature of the project- big differences in opinion between actors in the network about 
content and nature of the project 
- Interdependency: No interdependency between organizations in the network- high 
interdependency between organizations in the network.  
The figure below provides the information for the questions. As can be seen in general there are many 
organizations involved in the network. Some of the networks are very large (especially the relative large 
number of projects with more than 20 actors) while about half of the projects according to the respondents 
has only a moderate size (4-9 different actors). If it comes to the network characteristics of interactions, 
differences of opinion and dependency we can see that the scores do not differ very much and are all 
above the 5. Interactions are close to a score of a 7 on a 10 point scale. 
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We also asked for some specific characteristics of the decision-making process in which network actors 
are involved. The question asked was: how would you characterize the decision-making process in the 
network (scale from 1-10): 
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- No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (intensive involvement of citizens in 
the decision-making process) 
- No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of societal organizations) 
- No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament etc.)- intensive involvement of 
political bodies (municipal council, parliament, etc.) 
- Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-making is characterized by high 
transparency 
- Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few unexpected events- Decision-making is 
unpredictable and characterized by many unexpected events 
The graph below shows that especially the involvement of political bodies receives a high score and the 
involvement of citizens receives a relatively low score. Interestingly enough respondents do not find the 
process very unpredictable since this score is not very high (5,4 on 10 point scale). We could find no 
significant differences between the various groups of respondents. 
 
If we analyze the relation between the characteristics above and performance, innovativeness and 
trust we can see several interesting relations. First of all transparency is positively correlated to 
performance and innovativeness. And is actually the only significant factor. Trust is however 
positively influenced by more of the characteristics (actually all besides the unpredictability are 
significant). The strongest is the involvement of societal organization and the transparency. Since 
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trust in itself has a positive effect on performance these characteristics then would have an 
indirect effect on performance. They enhance the level of trust and trust enhances the 
performance but they do not have a strong direct effect on performance. 
Dependent 
variable Predictors B 
R 
square 
Performance 
No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process 
(intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process) - .073 .268*** 
 
No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of 
societal organizations) .068 
 
 
No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament 
etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, 
parliament, etc.) .020 
 
 
Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-
making is characterized by high transparency .5*** 
 
  
Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few 
unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and 
characterized by many unexpected events -.076   
Project 
Innovativeness 
No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process 
(intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process) - .004 .141*** 
 
No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of 
societal organizations) .129 
 
 
No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament 
etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, 
parliament, etc.) .078 
 
 
Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-
making is characterized by high transparency .262*** 
 
  
Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few 
unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and 
characterized by many unexpected events - .087   
Trust 
No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process 
(intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process) - 208* .363*** 
 
No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of 
societal organizations) .575*** 
 
 
No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament 
etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, 
parliament, etc.) - 233** 
 
 
Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-
making is characterized by high transparency .380*** 
 
  
Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few 
unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and 
characterized by many unexpected events -.124   
*** p < .005 ** p < .05* p < .1  
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10. Managerial strategies in the projects 
In the survey we included 7 items to measure managerial activity in the project. The first 6 items were 
based on earlier research (Klijn et al 2010) and measured two types of network management strategies: 
connecting and exploring. The last item was more inspired by the literature on project management. 
The items were 
- 1. During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting 
points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project 
- 2. Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, 
environmental groups, other public actors0 and their opinions 
- 3. In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and 
included 
- 4. (private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project 
management 
- 5. Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as 
external parties) 
- 6. When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find 
common ground between the conflicting interests 
- 7. There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, 
time and money 
As can be seen in the graph below the last managerial activity, the project management (item 7), is 
performed the most according to the respondents of the projects.  This obvious is considered as ‘business 
as usual’. The first and third activity, the development of common points of view and information needs 
and including different views are performed the least of all activities. There does not seem to be any large 
differences in the strategies used if we compare the various respondents 
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If we look at the effects of the managerial strategies on performance, innovativeness and trust 
again we see that especially strategy 3 (making different views explicit) 4 (consultation of 
implementing actors) but also 6 (searching for common ground) and strong project management 
have positive effect on performance. If it comes to project innovativeness other strategies (1 
developing common starting points and joint information and 2, involvement of stakeholders) are 
important. And if we look at the level of trust it is again strategy 2 and 3 that are most effective to 
improve the level of trust. 
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Dependent 
variable Predictors B R square 
Performance 
During information collection, emphasis was placed on 
establishing common starting points and common information 
needs between public and private parties in this project - .040 .396*** 
 
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external 
stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors 
and their opinions .081 
 
 
In the decision-making process about the project different views are 
made visible and included .304*** 
 
 
(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of 
the project management .238** 
 
 
Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract 
parties as well as external parties) - .127 
 
 
When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, 
management tried to find common ground between the 
conflicting interests .261*** 
 
  
There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-
formulated aims of scope, time and money .201**   
Project 
Innovativeness 
During information collection, emphasis was placed on 
establishing common starting points and common information 
needs between public and private parties in this project .230** .194*** 
 
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external 
stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors 
and their opinions .224** 
 
 
In the decision-making process about the project different views 
are made visible and included .071 
 
 
(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of 
the project management .149 
 
 
Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract 
parties as well as external parties) - .021 
 
 
When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, 
management tried to find common ground between the 
conflicting interests .007 
 
  
There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-
formulated aims of scope, time and money - .062   
Trust 
During information collection, emphasis was placed on 
establishing common starting points and common information 
needs between public and private parties in this project .094 .406*** 
 
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external 
stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors and 
their opinions - .041 
 
 
In the decision-making process about the project different views are 
made visible and included .342*** 
 
 
(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of 
the project management - .009 
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Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract 
parties as well as external parties) - .069 
 
 
When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, 
management tried to find common ground between the 
conflicting interests .113 
 
  
There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-
formulated aims of scope, time and money .020   
Hostile media 
attention 
During information collection, emphasis was placed on 
establishing common starting points and common information 
needs between public and private parties in this project - .042 .122** 
 
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external 
stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors 
and their opinions - .174* 
 
 
In the decision-making process about the project different views are 
made visible and included - .175* 
 
 
(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of 
the project management - .066 
 
 
Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract 
parties as well as external parties) .023 
 
 
When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, 
management tried to find common ground between the 
conflicting interests - .017 
 
  
There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-
formulated aims of scope, time and money - .098   
*** p < .005 
** p < .05 
   
    * p < .1 
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11. Conclusion: lessons for PPP 
 
 
Public private Partnership project in The Netherlands are complex can be concluded from this survey. 
Many projects include between 5 and 10 different involved parties. But there are also many projects that 
include 20 or more parties. The projects in general show more involvement of political bodies according 
to the respondents than of citizens and societal actors. Respondents also indicate that in general the project 
was characterized by a high number of stakeholders, technical complexity and that the project was 
affected by several external conditions difficult to influence. Thus if there is one clear conclusion that 
dominates the results of this survey it is the acknowledgement that these are fairly complex projects. 
Respondents in general rank the performance of these projects as relatively high (close to a 4 on a 4 point 
scale). They are more satisfied about the adequacy of the solutions and the content of the proposals than 
the costs and benefits (although these still are a little above 3,5) 
The most striking conclusion is probably the limited effect of contract characteristics on performance. 
This contrary to the wide literature on PPP’s that tend to lay much emphasizes on contractual 
characteristics. But in our survey we do not get spectacular results from contractual characteristics. There 
is some relation between the room for negotiation and performance but the relation is not very strong. And 
the overall explained variance is not very high. So practitioners probably should not expect too much for 
improvement of performance from contract characteristics. 
Trust on the other hand both between the contract partners and in the network of involved stakeholders as 
a whole seems very important. Trust between the partners then as it turns out in this survey is then more 
important than trust among actors in the wider networks. Given the types of respondents (people involved 
in the projects) and the types of projects (most of them DFBM contracts of some kind) this is not 
surprising. Along with trust managerial efforts are strongly related to (perceived) performance of PPP’s.  
Thus trust and managerial effort seems to be the strongest predictors of good performance according to 
our survey. This is in line with earlier research (see Steijn et al, 2011, Kort and Klijn 2011) which 
emphasize the importance of managerial strategies over organizational arrangements. 
The complexity of the projects, which we mentioned at the start of the conclusion, probably is the reason 
that contract characteristics are less important than trust and managerial effort. If projects are complex and 
show unexpected developments it is difficult, and probably impossible to foresee this in contracts that are 
written before the project starts (at least in terms of implementation). Complexity then has to be addressed 
by trust between the partners and managerial effort to solve the newly emerging developments and 
problems. The moment partners need the contract to solve their problems the project probably is already in 
danger. So that is the second main lesson for practitioners: do install organizational forms and contracts 
but do not expect them to lead to good performance. That is secured by building trust relations and putting 
in enough managerial efforts to stimulate coordination between partners, deal with a complex environment 
and buffer unexpected events and developments 
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i
 De Standard Deviation of the items is 2,4 (item 1), 2,06 (item 2), 2,1 (item 3), 2,9 (item 4), 2,5 (item 5), 2,2 (item 6 
